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what haq been done in this case, innsmuch as the ship in question was released upon -in agreetnient that nil
remedies against the shi,and against
the owners should be tried in this
country. Such an agreement would

We may hope that such legislation
may be adopted, where the rule still pre-

give jurisdiction by consent."

laws.

vails, that a distinction founded upon

reasons which have long since passed
away, and which often causes a failure
of justice, may be obliterated from our
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BANK.

Kational Bank-Baibnent-Power of a 1'atlonalBank to receive on
deposit Bonds as collteral security fir the existing Debts Of a Customer,
an .forfutre Loans and Discounts-Liabilityof a iYationul Bank for
the loss of Bonds depositedfor such Int:pose --The Third National Bank
of Baltimore was organized under the National Currency Act of 1864,
cl. 106. The firm of W. A. B. & Co, of which W. A. B. was the
senior member, was a large customer of the bank, through which all the
banking business of the firm was transacted, and from which it received
accommodations -as needed. On the 5th of February 1866, the firm
was indebted to the bank about $5000, and W. A. B. voluntarily proposed to the president of the bank to deposit with the bank about $37,000
in bonds, :s collateral security for his present and future indebtedness.
Subsequently, as agreed between W. A. B. and the president of the bank,
certain bonds and stocks were deposited as collateral security for the
payment of all obligations of W. A. B. and W. A. B. & Co. to the bank,
then existing, or that might be incurred thereafter, with the understanding that the right to sell such collaterals in satisfaction of such
obligations, was vested in the officers of the bank. Some of the bonds
were subsequently withdrawn and others deposited in their place.
While these collaterals remained in the bank, the firm kept a deposit
account with the bank, having an average amount of about $4000 on
deposit, and from time to time as it needed, obtained discounts ranging
1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions

filed during Oct. Term 1876. The cases will probably be reported in 4 or 5 Otto.
2 From Hon. W. C. Webb, Reporter; to appear in 17 and 18 Kansas Reports.
3 From J. D. Pulsifer, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 66 Maine Reports.
4 From T. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 44 Maryland Reports.
r From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in I1 Rhode Island Reports.
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from $2000 to $15,000, on the security of the collaterals ; it sometimes
owed the bank nothing, but left the bonds in its vault; at times when
the firm wanted money fbr a very short time, it obtained it from the bank,
on the security of these collaterals, on what were called "call loans,"
by checks. The officers of the bank considered the account of the firm
a very desirable one, and the arrangement by which every liability of
theirs was secured by the collaterals, very advantageous to the bank.
The firm was not indebted to the bank subsequent to July 1872, when
it paid its last indebtedness; the bonds were not withdrawn, but left in
the bank under the original agreement. Between Saturday evening
the 17th and Monday morning the 19th of August 1872, the bank was
entered by burglars and certain of the bonds were stolen. By section
8 of the Act of Congress of 1864, ch. 106, a bank organized thereunder,
is authorized "to exercise all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking, by discounting promissory
notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits, by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion; by loaning money on personal security, and by obtaining, issuing and circulating
notes according to the provisions of this act." In an act.ion by W. A.
B. against the bank, to recover the value of the bonds which were stolen,
it was held: 1. That the contract entered into by the bank was not a
mere gratuitous bailment; 2. That the bank had the power to enter
into the contract, it being within the terms of the Act of Congress ; 3t
That the original contrabt ot bailment being valid and bindiiig, the obligation of the bank fbr the safe custody of the deposit, did not cease when
the plaintiff's debt had been paid; 4. That the defendant was respon.
sible if the bonds were stoldn in consequence of its failure to exercise
such care and diligence in their custody or keeping, as at the time,
banks of common prudence in like situation and business usually bestowed in the custody and keeping of similar property belonging to
themselves ; that the care and diligence ought to have been such as was
properly adapted to the preservation and protection of the property, and
should have been proportioned to the consequence likely to arise from
any improvidence on the part of the defendant; 5. That the proper
measure of damages was the market value of the bonds at the time they
were stolen : Third National Bank of Baltimore v. Boyd, 44 Md.
Whether due care and diligence have been exercised by a bank in the
custody of bonds deposited with it as collateral security, is a questiopn of
fact exclusively within the province of the jury to decide : Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
Assignment in Fraud of C6editos-1Isolvency-Computation of
lThie.-Transfers of property by an insolvent debtor, within four months
before thie filing of the petition in bankruptcy against such debtor, with
a view to give a preference to any creditor are forbidden by the Bankrupt Act, and such transfer is void if the person receiving the same, or
to be benefited thereby, had reasonable cause to believe that such debtor
was insolvent, and that such transfer was made in fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act : Dutcher et al. v. Wright, Assigqnec, S. C.U.
S.. Oct. Term 1876.
Insolvency in one sense of the Bankrupt Act means that the party
whose business affairs are in question is unable to pay his debts as they
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become due, in the ordinary course of his daily transactions ; and a
creditor iilay be said to have reasonable cause to believe his debtor to
be insolvent when such a state of facts is brought to his notice respecting the affairs and pecuniary condition of his debtor as would lead a
prudent inan to the conclusion that the debtor is unable to meet his
obligations as they mature, in the ordinary course of his business : fd.
Congress has defined the meaning of certain terms employed in the
Bankrupt Act, and has regulated the mode of 'computing time "in all
cases in which any particular number of days is prescribed by the act or
shall be mentioned in any rule or order of court, or general order which
shall, at any time, be under the same, for the doing of any act or for
any other purpose," the rule enacted being that the computation "shall
be reckoned, in the absence of any expression to the contrary, exclusive
of the first and inclusive of the last day, unless the last day shall" be
dies non within the judicial sense: Id.
Where the computation is to be made from an act done, the day on
which the act is done to be included : Id.
P. being insolvent was, on the 8th of April 1870, adjudged bankrupt
pursuant to his own petition. On the 8th of December 1869, P. having
been for a long time insolvent and largely indebted to D. and others for
goods, wares and merchandise, with the knowledge of said D. and others,
assigned to them certain portions of his property consisting of promissory
notes and other evidences of indebtedness, with a view to give a preference to said D. and others over the other creditors of the bankrupt, and
in fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act. Held, that this was a.
transfer within four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy and therefore void, and further, that the day the petition in
bankruptcy was filed must be excluded in making the computatiA
Id.
BiLL or LADIG. See aSliMing.
BiLs AND Noms.
Immaterial Alteration.-A note payable to the order of W. was before
issue endorsed by F. It was signed by G., and this signature was at
the request of W. changed to " G., agent." The note was given for G.'s
private debt. F. did not assent to the change, and there was no evidence
to show that G.'s principals were accustomed to pay notes drawn in this
form. In an action against F.: HeNl, that the change was immaterial:
Hanuf.'. Mer. Bank v. oUett, 11 R. I.
Held, further, affirming MHathewson v. Sprague,1 I. I. 8, and Perkins
v. Barstow, (3 IL I. 505, that F. was not entitled to notice of non-payment: Id.
Notice of Protest-Dutyof Notary.-It is no part of the official duty
of a notary public by the general law merchant, or the statute of Kansas, to give notice of the protest or dishonor of a bill or note, and
although it is usual and convenient for the notary to give the notice in
such case, he is the mere agent of the holder or party authorized to
give the notice : Swayze v. Britton, 18 Kans.
_ote siqncd hin
Blank-Authority to fill 7p.-Where J. and C. endorse
a negotiable promissory note, which, so far as the dates, the amount, &c.,
are concerned, is in blank, and give said note to L. to be negotiated in a
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bank in paying and taking up another note for $1000, then due and held
by the bank against J.and L. and a third person, and J. and C. instruct
IL.to fill up said new note for S406 only, but L., in violation of such
instructions, fills it up or allows the bank to do so for $1000, and then
L. with said new note pays and takes up the old one, and the bank is
fully aware that said new note was executed and endorsed in blank, but
'is not aware and has no notice that the note was filled up for a larger
amount than was authorized by J. and C.: ield, that a promissory note
may legally be executed and endorsed in blank, that the bank in this
case is an innocent and bonafide holder of said new note for value, and
is therefore not responsible fbr or chargeable with the wrong committed
by L., and may therefore recover against J. and C. the full amount of
said note : Joseph v. First National Bank of Eldorado, 17 Kans.
BOND.

Joint and sererd Odgation.-In debt on a writing obligatory, as
follows: "'Know all men by these presents that we, Wiliiam J. Clark,
of the city of Providence, R. I., as principal, and A. E. Burnside, Eben
A. Kelly, and John Gorham, as sureties, are held and firmly bound unto
the president, directors, and company of the Commercial National Bank
of the city of Providence, R. I., in the sum of $10,000, that is to say,
the said William J. Clark in the whole of said sum above named, and
the said A. E. Burnside, Eben A. Kelly, and John Gorham, each as
surety respectively in the sum of $3333.33 to be paid to then, the said
Commercial National Bank, their attorney, successors or assigns, for
which payment well and truly to be made, we do hereby bind ourselves,
our heirs, executors, and administrators firmly by these presents." ield,
that the obligation was several, Clark being bound in one whole sum of
$10,000; and Burnside, Kelly, and Gorfiam, being each bound in one
sum of $3333.33: Connmercial.rational Bankd v. Gorham, 11 R. I.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

of the Act extending linits
.Mt icipat Corporation-Costititionaitiy
of Frederick Qiy-Power of the Legislature over Atuiicipal Co)porations.-The Act of 1870, ch. 314, extending the taxable limits of Frederick City, and authorizing the mayor, aldermen and common council
thereof to assess, levy and collect taxes within the extended limits, is not
repugnant to the provision of the constitution (Art. 3, sect. 40) which
prohibits the taking of private property for public use, without just compensation. This provision of the constitution is a limitation on the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and has no reference whatever
to the taxing power: Groff v. The Jl1ayor of Frederick Cityi, 44 Md.
The legislature has the power to create municipal corporations, to
amend their charters, enlarge or diminish their powers, extend or limit
their boundaries, consolidate two or more into one, overrule their legislative action, whenever it is deemed unwise, impolitic or unjust, and
even abolish them altogether in the legislative discretion: Id.
Where the legislature in the exercise of its constitutional power extends
the taxable limits of a city, a court of equity will not interfere by injunction to restrain the collection of taxes, imposed by the municipal authority upon property within the limits thus extended, to defray the
expenses of the corporation, because such property is used for farming
and pasturing purposes : Id.
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CONTRACT.

Tinpire-E stoppelt.-I. sued thq city of Omaha on a contract for the
construction of two public wells in the streets of that city. The contract
was in writing, and by its terms I. was "to sink and construct two wells,
said wells to be circular, twelve feet in diameter, and to be curbed with
a brick wall nine inches in thickness, and arched over in a secure and
proper manner, the whole to be completed under the supervision and to
tile satisfaction of the chief engineer of the fire department of said city.
H. proved the construction of the wells under the supervision of the
engineer to his entire satisfaction, and his final acceptance of them. But
it was also proved that while the main part of the wells was sunk to the
depth of twenty to twenty-three feet of the diameter of twelve feet, the
brick curbing of nine inches in thickness, built inside the shaft so sunk,
reduced this diameter t6 ten and a half feet, and that smaller shafts of
four or five feet in diameter were sunk below the bottom of the main
well to the depth of several feet. These two circumstances constituted
the defence of the city. Held, that tae city was concluded by the action
of its own officer, the engineer, who was also by the terms of the contract authorized by the parties to it to decide these questions : CYty of
Omaha v. Hammond, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
Modification of-Guaranty- Waiver-Mutitality.-D. and F. sent
certain bonds of the California Central Pacific Railroad Co., to certain
brokers in New York who had agreed to purchase them, and at the same
time sent a letter containing the following language : " We would
further add that we have purchased the bonds from a party strange to
us; and not having ever handled any of the Pacific Central, we would
sell the bonds without recourse as to their being genuine ; consequently,
please examine them, and upon being found correct, telegraph immediately (Central all 0. K). We do not doubt the bonds, but coming to
us through strange parties, we use this as a precaution, and are not willing
to take any risk." Reid, that this language did not amount to a proposal to waive the warranty that the bonds were genuine. STRONG, CLIFFORD and HUNT, JJ., dissenting: Utley et al. v. Donaldson et al., S.
C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
There can be no contract without the mutual assent of the parties.
This is vital to its existence. There can be none where it is wanting,
and it is as indispensable to the modification of a contract already made
as it was to making it originally : Id.
Eatire and Divisible- Waiver of Condition-Delivery .M[onthlyVaiver of Breach of a Condition, recedent.-The plaintiffs contracted with the defendant to deliver to it 12,000 carboys of oil of
vitriol of a specified quality and price, free of charge, in tanks at the
defendant's factory. The delivery to be 2000 carboys monthly, in daily
deliveries-as wanted, during the months of September, October, November and December 1873, and- January and February 1874. settlements
to he made monthly in the defendant's paper, at four months. Held:
1. That said contract must be construed by the standard of intention
apparent on its face; 2. That the parties could not have considered it
entire and indivisible either in quantity or in the details of its per.
formance: Maryland Fertilizing and Manufacturing Co. v. Lorentz,
44 Md.
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The plaintiffs fiiled to make any delivery under the contract in the
month of September, but with the consent of the defendant made partial deliveries in October and November, which were settled for, and the
defendant then stopped them from delivering any more in said last two
months, and sent them a letter declining to receive any more. Beld,
that a prayer of defendant founded on the breach of the covenant to
deliver the September. instalment, without submitting to the jury the
question of a waiver of such breach by the subsequent dealings between
the parties, was founded upon too narrow a view of the contract: Id.
A condition precedent may be waived by the subsequent dealings
between the parties to the contract : 11.
CORPORATION.

Agreement to take Stock- Conditions.&-Tbe defendant subscribed an
agreement to take the amount of shares set against his name in the
capital stock of the plaintiff railroad company agreeably to conditions,
one of which was that no assessment except fbr a preliminary survey and
location should be made, nor 'ny work upon the road commenced until
the full amount was secured for its completion to (or as far as to) Newport. The subscriptions were less in amount than the actual cost; and,
if a deduction be made of invalid conditional subscriptions, were much
less than the cost estimated by the engineer. Teld, that the defendant's
subscription was invalid: Belast & Moosehead Lake Railroad Co. v.

Cottrell, 66 Me.
Subscriptionto Stock.-After the grant of a charter providing that the
capital should not exceed 2000 shares of $100 each, subscriptions were
received as follows, "4The subscribers severally agree to and with the
Warwick Railroad Company that we will take the number of shares of
$100 each in the capital stock of said company, set opposite our respective names under the provisions of its charter, and that we will pay for
the same in such manner as the board of directors may, under the charter, direct." In an action by the corporation against a defaulting subscriber: Held, that the contract was good, and the subscriber liable,
notwithstanding the whole capital was not subscribed for: Warwick
Railroad Co. v. Cady, 11 R. I.
Held, farther, that the word share did not imply a proportion of a
definite capital: Id.
Held, further, that subscribing for a share was equivalent to subscribing for $100: [d.
This case distinguished from those in which a definite capital was fixed,
or a definite proportion or sum was required as a condition precedent to
organization, or conditional subscriptions were made : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Homicide-Seyf-defence. -Where one commences an altercation with
another, and strikes his adversary with his hand, with no purpose or
design to kill or cause great bodily injury to him, and his adversary
repels such assault with a deadly weapon, and after the assailed has shot
and wounded the assailant, and has retired behind a wall and the assailant
ceases to follow, but has neither retreated nor attempted any abandonment
of the conflict: Held, that the assailant is not justified in defending his
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own life to the taking the life of the other, even if the assailed attempts
at the time to shoot the assailant: State v. Rogers, 18 Kans.
CURTESY.
Liability to Attachment.-Tenancy by the curtesy initiate, is not subject to attachment in Rhode Island for the husband's debts: Greenwich
Nat. Bank v. Hall, 11 R. I.
DAMAGES. See Bank.
DEED.

Boundary by Highway.-A deed bounding the grantee by a highway
conveys the fee to the centre of the highway, when the title of the
grantor extends so far. Thus: where plaintiff's land was north of and
adjoining the defendant's; and the defendant's deed, which was the
earlier, described his land as being the south part of the west half of
lot number 23, and bounded on the north by a line parallel with thq
north line of said half lot, and so far south of the north line as to leave
forty acres and no more north of the first mentioned line; on the east
by a line dividing lot number 23 in the centre from north to south; on
the south by lot number 26 ; and on the west by the county road.
Held, that the divisional line between the lands of the parties is one
drawn from east to west over the west half of lot number 23 to the centre
of the highway parallel with, and so far south of, the north line of the
lot as to leave forty acres in the west half of the lot north of it: Webber
v. Overlock et al., 66 Me.
DomICILE.
Abandonment of.-The domicile of a party in any particular locality is
acquired by a union of intent and of presence. Thus : The defendant, a
shipmaster., left his home in Stockton, in September 1871, on a voyage,
intending to abandon Stockton as his home and, on his return from sea,
to go to Searsport and make it his home thereafter. On his return in
June 187"2, he married a resident of Searsport, and remained there a few
days, then went to sea with his wife, returned to Searsport in May 1874,
and left his family there, not having been in Stockton except on a visit
since 1871. Held, in an action by Stockton, for taxes for the years
1872-3-4, that from and after June 1872, when there was a union of
intent and of presence in Searsport, his domicile was in Searsport, and
not in Stockton: Inhabitants of Stockton v. Staples, 66 Me.
DOWER.

See Legacy.

ERRORS AND APPEALS.

Supersedeas-Practicein U. S. Supreme Court.-It was not the intention of Congress, under the Act of 1789, to interfere at all with the
practice of the state courts as to executions upon their judgments until
a supersedeas was actually perfected: Doyle v. State of Wisconsin ex
rel. Drake, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
If an execution is issued upon a judgment in the courts of the United
States after the expiration of ten days, a supersedeas afterwards obtained
will prevent further proceedings under the execution, but will not interfere with what has already been done: Id.
When on a peremptory mandamus from a state court, the secretary

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

377

of state of Wisconsin revoked the license of a foreign insurance company
within ten days, a writ of error perfected afterwards will not interfere
with what had already been done under the state writ: Id.
EVIDENCE.

When to be submitted to Jui.--Judges are no longer required to sub-

mit a case to the jury merely because some evidence has been introduced
by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such
a character that it would warrant the jury to proceed in finding a verdict in favor of the party introducing such evidence : County Commissioners v. Clark, S. C. U. S., %t. Term 1876.

Decided cases may be found where it is held that if there is a scintilla of evidence in support of a case the judge is bound to leave it to
the jury, but the modern decisions have established a more reasonable
rule, to wit, that before the evidence is left to the jury, there is or may
be in every case a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there
is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom
the burden of proof is imposed : Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

See Real Estate.

GUARDIAN.
See Trust.
HIGHWAY. See Municipal Corporation.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Mortgage.

Wife's separate Property- Wife's Earnings.-Realestate purchased

by the wife, so far as paid for by money or means of her own, cannot be
taken to pay her husband's debts ; but is, in equity, liable therefor, so
far as it may be proved to have been paid for by money earned through
her personal services jointly with his, while living in the marital relation, upon such real estate, carrying on a farm, and keeping a public
house thereon: Sampson et al. v. Alexander et al., 66 Me.
INSOLVENCY. See Bankruptcy.
INSURANCE.

Agreement as to Amount of Loss subject to Terms ofPolicy -After

loss

by fire the parties in interest fixed the amount of loss and damage,
"subject to terms and conditions of several policies." In an action
against the insurers: Held, that this adjustment meant "subject to"
all the "terms and conditions of the policies" not superseded by the
agreement : Vhipple v. . Brit. & Mer. Fire Ins. Co., 11 R. I.
Held, further, that the question of liability was not affected by this
adjustment, which only determined the amount due in case of liability:
Id.
Failureof the Insitred to diiclose Mortgages on the Property.-Apolicy

insuring certain buildings therein particularly described against loss or
damage by fire, provided that the conditions thereunto annexed should
form part of the instrument, and were to be resorted to in order to
explain the rights and obligations of the parties to it. By one of the
conditions it required every applicant for insurance in the company to
VoL. XXV.-48
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state any cnc-::nbrancc that might exist on the property to be insured;
and by another, it declared that "if any person insuring any building
or goods in this office shall make any misrepresentation or concealment,
such insurance shall be void." Prior to, and at the time the policy was
issued, there wege two mortgages on the insured buildings, the existence
of which was never communicated to the insurance company or its agent.
The main building insured was destroyed, and the building adjoining
greatly damaged by fire, during the time covered by the policy. In an
action by the insurcd to recover on the policy, it was held, that the
failure by the assured to disclose the existence of the mortgages, avoided
the policy and defeated the action: Beck v. HiberniaIns. Co., 44 Md.
JOINT AND SEVERAL OBLIGATION.

See Bond.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Implied Obligation of Tenant to Repair-Liabilityof United States
as Lessee.-In every lease there is, unless excluded by the operation of
some express covenant or agreement, an implied obligation on the part
of the lessee t,) so use the property as not unnecessarily to injure it or
to treat the premises demised in such manner that no injury be done to
the inheritance. but that the estate may revert to the lessor undeterio.
.iated by the wilful or negligent conductof the lessee : Thie Uhited States
v. Bostwiik, Adn'xz; Bostwick v. Tle United States, S. 0. U. S., Oct.
Term 1876.
This implied obligation is part of the contract itself, as much so as if
incorporated into it by express language. It results from the relation
of landlord and tenant which tie contract creates: l.
It is not a covenant to repair generally, but to so use the property as
to avoid the necessity for repairs as far as possible. It is in effect a
covenant against voluntary waste, and nothing more. It has never been
so construed as to make a tenant answerable for accidental damages, or
to bind him to iebuild if the buildings are burned down or otherwise
destroyed by accident: Id.
The United States when they contract with their citizens are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf. All
obligations which would be implied against citizens under the same circumstances will be implied against them : .L
L. leased a certain property to the United States without making anuy
express covenant as to repairs. During the occupancy under the lease
ornamental trees were destroyed ; fences and walls torn down, materials
uscd for sidewalks and the erection of other buildings were carried away
and stone was quarried and gravel dug and taken away. .field,that this
was voluntary waste and within the prohibition of the implied agreement
in the lease and that the United States were liable : Id.
LEGACY.

In lieu of Dowar-Abatement.-A general pecuniary bequest in lieu
of dower is not subject to abatement pro rata with the other pecuniary
bequests in case of insufficient assets: Potter v. Brown, 11 R. I.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

See Trespass.
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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

3M(dice in Fact.-Though malice in fact, as distinguished from malice
-in law, is essential to the maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution, yet such "malice in fact" is not restricted to its popular meaning
of ill-will, resentment, personal hatred, or the like ; any act done wilfuliy
and purposely to the prejudice and injury of another, which is unlawful,
is, in a legal sense, malicious, and is also in fact malicious; but malice
in fact is found by the jury, while malice in law is found by the court.
.Pulienv. Glidlen, 66 Mie.
MORTGAGE.

See Usury.

Demand.-The plaintiff made a demand on the mortgagee at a store
two miles from his residence, to render an account, under R. S., c. 90,
§ 13, to which the reply was that about eleven hundred dollars was due
on the mortgage; and when requested to render a more particular account, he replied that he would not until obliged. No objection was
taken to the place where the demand was made. The parties were acquainted with each other. The mortgagee shortly after left the state
and did not return. Four years intervened between the demand and
the suit. Held, that under the circumstances the demand was sufficient: Wallace v. Stevens et als , 66 Me.
.Vortgage by Marricd Woman-Evidence admissible to prove the Consideration.-A. being indebted to B. in the sum of $2000, gave his note
under seal for the amount. Some time afterward B. told A. that he
would like to have a mortgage on his wife's property to secure the paymenr of the note. A. expressed his willingness to give the mortgage,
and promised to ascertain whether his wife would consent to execute it.
The mortgage was accordingly prepared, and executed by A., who then
took it to his wife, accompanied by a justice of the peace, and told her
that there was another paper to which he wanted her name. She did
not read the paper or ask what it was; nor did she seek any explanation
either from her husband or the justice of the peace as to its character or
contents, but executed and acknowledged it, and it was afterwards
delivered to B. the mortgagee. A. testified th'at he did not tell his wife
that the paper was a mortgage, because he knew that she was opposed
to giving mortgages. The wife stated that she would not have executed
the paper, if she had known it was a mortgage. The mortgagee had no
knowledge, until long afterwards, that the wife of A. had executed the
mortgage in ignorance of its character. field, that under these circumstances the wife had no right of relief by injunction to restrain the
mortgagee from the foreclosure of the mortgage, upon the ground that
its execution was prooured by fraud and deceit: Comeg2ys v. Curke,
44 Md.
A mortgage stated that the consideration therefor was S2000, "cash
in hand paid," and the evidence showed that it was a note under seal
for the same amount, a pre-existing debt due to the mortgagee, by one
of the mortgagors. feld, that the consideration proved was not different in character from that stated in the mortgage, and the proof was
therefore admissible in support-of the consideration stated in the mortgage: Id.
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It is competent for a married woman to give a mortgage upon her
property to secure the payment of a debt due by her husband; and a
mortgage executed by her for such purpose cannot be said to be without
consideration : Id.
MUNIdIPAL CORPORATION. See 0onstitutional Law.
Bonds of-ssued to aid constructionof a Railroad- When negotiable.
-Bonds executed by a municipal corporation to aid in the construction
of a railroad, if issued in pursuance of a power conferred by the legislature, are valid commercial instruments, and if purchased for value in the
usual course of business before they are due, give the holder a good title,
free of prior equities between antecedent partibs, to the same extent as
in the case of bills of exchange and promissory notes: County Commissioners v. Clark, S. C. IT. S., Oct. Term 1876.
Such a power is frequently conferred to be exercised in a special manner or subject to certain regulations, conditions, or qualifications, but if
it appears that the bonds issued show by their recitals that the power
was exercised in the manner required by the legislature, and that the
bonds were issued in conformity to the prescribed regulations and pursuant to the required conditions and qualifications, proof that any or all
of the recitals are incorrect will not constitute a defence to the corporation in a suit on the bonds or coupons, if it appears that it was the sole
province of the municipal officers who executed the bonds to decide
whether or not there had been an antecedent compliance with the regulations which it is alleged were not fulfilled: Id.
Highway--Neyligence- Who are Agents of Cty.-A statute of the
state, enabling a city to introduce pure water, empowered the city to
elect water commissioners for a fixed term, and for such subsequent
terms as the city might determine, to prescribe the duties and compensation of the commissioners, and to regulate the mode and causes of
their removal from office. The city owned the waterworks, received
rents for water, and controlled the use and distribution of the water.
In an action against the city for damages resulting from an unsafe highway, the damage being caused by a stream of water thrown from a city
hydrant across the highway by the employees of the water commissioners. Held, that the water commissioners and their employees were the
servants of the city, and that the city was responsible fox their acts:
Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 R. I.
A city or town charged with a public duty in consideration of valuable privileges, is liable to an individual who suffers special injury from
a neglect of duty, and a city or town which derives an emolument from
the exercise of powers conferred upon it is liable for the negligent or
unskilful exercise of these powers by its agents, or for the neglect of a
duty which is imposed by or results from the exercise of them: Id.
In such cases the officers engaged in the execution of the powers are
to be regarded as the agents of such city or town : Id.
NATIONAL BANK.

NEGLIGENCE.

See Bank.

See Municipal Corporation.

Contributory? Negligence-Remote Negligence of Plaintff.-Because
a plaintiff is himself negligent, or is acting in violation of a law, he is
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not therefore prevented from recovering damages for an injury which
has resulted from the negligence of a defendant, where but for the want
of ordinary care on the part of the defendant the misfortune would not
have happened: Klipper v. Coffey, 44 Md.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for an injury to his carriage and
horses, occasioned by the horses becoming frightened by the alleged
negligent act of the defendant. The plaintiff was warned of the danger
ill time to reach his horses before the accident, and had he reached
them he might possibly have held them in check and the injury have
been avoided. Held, that his failure to reach them sooner did not constitute in law contributory negligence: Id.
The question of contributory negligence is properly presented to the
jury by a prayer which instructs them that they cannot find for the
plaintiffs, if they "shall find that the injury to the plaintiffs' hack and
horses is attributable to the combined negligence of the plaintiffs and
defendants :" Id.
Railroad-juljryto Person in another State.-Section 422 of the
civil code of Kansas, General Statutes 1868, p. 709, has no extra territorial force and does not confer a right of action for an injury inflicted
in another state: McCarthy,Adm'r, v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railroad Co., 18 Kans.
Where an inhabitant of this state is injured in the state of Missouri
by the wrongful acts of a railway company operating a railroad in the
latter state, and thereupon is brought to this state and dies here from
the effects of such wrongful acts: Held, that the personal representative of the intestate, appointed under the laws of this state, cannot maintain an action therefor in this state against such railway company under
sect. 422 of the civil code : Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Dissolution-Wlho entitled to actual Arotice.-Only those who are in
the habit of dealing with a partnership are entitled to actual notice of
its dissolution: Merritt v. Williams, 17 Kans.
A single cash sale of cattle to a partnership dealing in cattle does not
make the vendor such a dealer as entitles him to actual notice of the
dissolution of the partnership, or through lack of such notice to hold
both partners on a sale made two years thereafter and eighteen months
after the dissolution of the firm, where the actual dealings are had with
only one of the former partners: .d.
PRACTICE.
See Errors and Appeals.
Agreement of Counsel.-Stipulations between counsel relative to the
course of proceeding in a cause pending in this court, as e. g. to submit
the case on printed briefs, cannot be withdrawn by one party without the
consent of the other, except by leave of the court upon cause shown:
.Milleret al. v. Dows et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1876.
PURPRESTURE.

See Waters.

EEAL ESTATE.

Grass-Actionfor Trespass must be by Owner.-Wild grass growing
on wild, unoccupied, uncultivated land, is a part of the realty, and an
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attempted transfer of such grass by parol agreement is void, as a conveyance of the grass under the Statute of Frauds (Gen. Stat. 505, sects.
5, 6), and where such grais was destroyed by the cattle of' a third person, the owner of the land only, and not the person to whom such grass
was attempted to be transferred, can maintain an action for the destruction of the grass: Powers v. Clarkson, 17 Kans.
RIPARIAN OWNER. See Waters.
SHIPING.
Authority of Muster-Bill of Lading-The master of a shir, has no
authority to sign a bill of lading for goods not actually put on board, and
therefore the owner of the ship is not responsible to parties taking, or
dealing with, or making advances on the faith of such an instrument
which is untruthful in this particular. The consignee and every other
party thus acting does so with notice of this limitation of the power of
the master, and acts at his own risk both as respects the fact of shipment
and the quantity of cargo purported by a bill of lading to be shipped:
.Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Wilkens, 44 11d.
Bills of lading are not negotiable in the same sense in which bills of
exchange or promissory notes are. They stand in the place of the goods
they represent, and delivery or endorsement of them transfers the right
of property in the goods, but not in the contract itself so as to enable
the endorsee to maintain at the common law an action on it in his own
name: Id.
A railroad company is not liable for advances made by a commission
merchant upon the faith of a bill of lading fraudulently signed by one
of its station agents, the goods therein specified never having been shipped
or received at the depot for transportation : Id.
TAXATION. See Constitutional Law.
TIME. See BanLruptcy.
TRESPASS. See Real Estate.
Continung-Ditch on another's Land-Statute of Limitaiions.Where A. enters upon the land of B. and digs a ditch thereon, there is
a direct invasion of the rights of B., a completed trespass, and the cause
of action for all injuries resulting therefrom commences to run at the
time of the trespass. And the fact that A. does not re-enter B.'s land
and fill up the ditch does not make him a continuous wrongdoer and
liable to repeated actions as long as the ditch remains unfilled: K. P.
R. W. Co. v. Mihlman, 17 Kans.
A party may be responsible as a continued wrongdoer, as for permitting a nuisance to remain upon his lands, but no one can be charged
as such continuing wrongdoer who has not the right and is not under
the duty of terminating that which causes the injury: Id.
A party who enters another's land and commits a trespass by digging
a ditch does not thereby acquire a right to re-enter and fill up the ditch.
He would be liable as a trespasser if he did so re-enter: Id.
Though from a completed wrong there afterwards results new and
unforeseen injury, there does not arise a new cause of action, and if a
recovery has been had for the wrong prior to the occurrence of the new
injury, no recovery can be had for such injury : Id.
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After a wrong has been committed, it is the duty of the injured party
to make reasonable efforts to prevent an increase or extension of the
injury, and if he fails to do so he cannot recover fbr such increased
injury : Id.
TRIAL. See

Evidence.

TRUST.
Guardianand Ward.-Where a guardian receives a conveyance of
the estate of his ward in his own name and includes it in the inventory as his ward's property, charging the estate of his ward with the expenses incurred in its management and accounting for its proceeds, he
is to be regarded as holding the estate in trust: Fogler, Guardian,v.
Buck et als., Adr'rs, 66 Me.
UNITED STATES.

See Landlord and Tenant.

UsuRY.
Only available to Party.-The plea of usury is a personal privilege,
and if the debtor declines to avail himself of it no stranger to the transaction can: Pritehett v. Rollins et al., 17 Kans.
A second mortgagee cannot plead usury in a prior mortgage either to
defeat or postpone its lien : Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Misrepresentationas to the Title- When the Vendee may rescind his
Contract.-The defendant agreed to sell the plaintiff a parcel of ground,
and the latter paid her in advance a portion of the purchase-money, and
afterwards brought an action against her t6 recover it back, on the
ground of a misrepresentation made by her in regard to her title. Evidence was offered tending to show that during the negotiations for the
sale the defendant represented that she held a fee-simple estate in the
property, but that in fact she held only a leasehold estate as assignee of
.a sub-lease. There was also evidence tending to show that after the
part payment of the purehase-money the plaintiff made objection to the
title, and that by agreement the contract of purchase was rescinded and
abandoned, and the defendant offered to repay the money. Held, that
if these facts were found by the jury and stood alone, there could be no
doubt'of the right of the plaintiff to recover: Gunby v. Sluter, 44 Md.
If the misrepresentations are material and substantial, they vkitate
the contract, though made by mistake, being to the advantage of the
party making them : Rd
To entitle a purchaser to rescind his contract upon the ground of maas to the title, it must apterial misrepresentations made by the vendor
them : Id.
pear that he was actually misled by
The original contract of purchase was not in writing, but was proved
by parol evidence without objection, and this evidence, offered in the
first instance by the plaintiff, was relied on by both sides as establishing
a valid agreement of purchase, and in the same manner parol evidence
was offered of an agreement to rescind and abandon the contract and to
return the money. Held, 1. That no exception having been taken to
the admissibility of the latter evidence the defendant cannot on appeal
object to its admissibility ; 2. That the abandonment and surrender by
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the plaintiff of his interest in the property under the original contract
was a sufficient consideration for the promise on the part of the defendant to repay the money; 3. That the effect of the rescission, if proven,
was to entitle the plaintiff to the return of the money, and no express
promise was neqessary : Id.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.

Riparian Owner-Harbor Line-Prpresture.-The establishment
of a harbor line in Rhode Island, gives to proprietors within the line
the privilege of filling out and extending their land to it: Engs v. Peckham, 11 R. I.
A. and B. each owned a projecting wharf. These wharves were separated by a dock. B. also owned the land at the inland end of the dock.
After the establishment by the state of a harbor line, running in front
of the wharves, B. proceeded to fill up the dock. A. filed a bill of complaint asking that B. may be enjoined. A. claiming relief-i. Because
he has a private right or easement in the dock which will be destroyed
by filling it; 2. Because the fee of the dock is -in the state, and filling
it, if not a public nuisance, is an unlawful intrusion or purpresture which
will be especially injurious to him. Held, that the bill could not be sustained : rd.
Stream-Right of Riparian Owners to natural Flow.-Every man
through whose land a stream of water runs is entitled to the flow of that
stream without diminution or alteration: Shamleffer v. Council Grove
Peerless Mill Co., 18 Kans.
The Council Grove .Peerless Mill Co. in 1874, with the assent of an
upper riparian owner, dug a channel through the lands of such owner
from a point on the Neosho river to its mill, and thereby diverted from
its natural channel through the land now belonging to plaintiff in error
a portion of said stream, and this without the assent of the then owner
of said plaintiff in error's land. Held, that thereby the mill company
acquired no right to continue said diversion or to restrain plaintiff id!
error from removing any obstruction, natural or artificial, in the bed of
said river on his lands: rd.
Where at the time of digging said channel the lands now belonging
to plaintiff in error were the property of a minor held by said minor
under a will, and where no legal proceedings were had to acquire the
right to the use of any portion of the stream, and no conveyance or. permission obtained from the executor of said will and guardian of said
minor, the mere knowledge on the part of said executor and guardian
that said company was engaged in digging said channel, and failure on
his part to object to said work or to take measures to prevent it, will
work no estoppel upon the minor, or prevent said minor from asserting
: Id.
her right to the flow of the entire stream in its nhtural channel
The right to the use of the flow of water in its natural course is connected with and inherent in the property in the land, and passes by a
conveyance of the land. Hence a deed of the land made by the executor and guardian, under orders of the probate court, conveyed to plaintiff in error the right to the flow of the entire stream in its natural channel, as before the digging of said artificial channel : Id.

